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    Small and Medium-sizes Enterprises (SMEs) has 
become the important support for Chinese economy 
development, but financing difficulty (represented with loan 
difficulty in China) constricted SMEs’ development. There 
are many reasons for the unwilling of banks’ loan to SMEs, 
one of the most important reason is the high default rate of 
SMEs. The research for the deep reason and prevention 
mechanisms of SMEs’ default has important reality 
significance. 
It has taken many Chinese researchers several years to study default problem 
of SMEs, however, no efficient solution has been found till now. I thought that the 
high default rate of SMEs reflected the fact that bank’s mechanism design through 
loan contract lost incentive function, and try to study the prevention mechanisms 
of SMEs’ moral hazard through the design of loan contract under the context of 
interest non-marketable. 
I thought that Chinese banks lack power tools to prevent from moral hazard 
of SMEs since loan interests are not decided by market. First of all, banks have no 
way to select between SMEs through setting the loan interest as the decrease 
function of mortgage, and high bankruptcy cost make banks’ liquidation threat 
incredible, therefore, mortgage’s prevention function disabled. Second, banks 
couldn’t inspire SMEs to pay back loan through contingent loan interest between 
different periods. While contingent loan probability contract may reduce some risk 














moral hazard would be influenced by economic status, bank manager’s judgment 
to the safety of project and cooperation mechanism of punishing defaulted SMEs. 
Under the condition of interest non-marketable, it’s necessary and possible for 
bank to grant loan with SMEs which has established long relationship with him. It 
could reduce efficiently the information asymmetric of SMEs and is an important 
and efficient method to prevent from SMEs’ moral hazard. 
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债务重组等方式悬空银行债务的情形。截至 2000年末，在工、农、中、建、
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润 ( ) (1 ) 0f L r Lπ = − + ≥ ，这同时也是银行发放贷款的条件。企业不违约的条
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，并因此促使借款人偿还贷款。在 Eaton & Gersovitz(1981)提出的更为复
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